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DENVER LAW CENTER JOURNAL
TAXATION - ESTATES AND TRUSTS - DOUBLE DEDUCTION OF
TRUSTEES' FEES.
Two months before her death, the decedent transferred proper-
ty into a revocable trust, retaining a life estate therein. Upon her
death the value of the property so transferred was included in her
gross estate for federal estate tax purposes under the authority of
Internal Revenue Code of 1954, §§ 2035,1 2036,2 and 2038.3 Under the
trust agreement the trustee was authorized to perform certain du-
ties4 after the settlor's death, and in connection therewith the
trustee paid trustee's fees in the amount of $22,934.79. Of this
amount the Tax Court5 allowed a deduction of $21,934.79 on the
trust's income tax return under the authority of section 212,6 and
also allowed a deduction of $22,096.78 on the estate tax return un-
der the authority of section 2053 (b).7
The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed, holding
(1) that section 642 (g) I does not require the disallowance of double
deductions in computing the income tax of a trust, even though the
trust property was included in the taxable estate; and (2) that the
authority of Treasury Regulation § 1.212-1 (o),9 which applies to sec-
tions 212 and 16210 in the disallowance of double deductions, has no
I Relating to transactions in contemplation of death. All transfers of property,
without adequate consideration, made within three years of the decedent's
death are presumed to have been made in contemplation of death and there-
fore are included in the gross estate. (All Section references are to the
Internal Revenue Code of 1954 unless otherwise indicated.)
2 Relating to transfers with a retained life estate. Such a transfer is accom-
plished when, without adequate consideration, a person placing property in
a trust retains for his life the possession, enjoyment, or right to the income
from the property.
3 Relating to revocable transfers. When property has been transferred without
adequate consideration into a trust, it is includable in the gross estate of
the one so transferring if on the date of the death of that person he held
the power to alter, amend, revoke, or terminate the trust.
4 The trust agreement authorized the trustee to pay the expenses of the
settlor's last illness, pay the estate and inheritance taxes, and make certain
distributions.
5 Mary E. Burrow Trust, 39 T.C. 1080 (1963).
6 Relating to expenses for the management and conservation of income, the
property from which it is produced, and expenses paid in connection with
the determination of any tax.
7 Relating to administrative expenses of nonprobate property.
8 Section 642(g) "Disallowance of Double Deductions. - Amounts allowable
under section 2053 or 2054 as a deduction in computing the taxable estate
of a decedent shall not be allowed as a deduction in computing the taxable
income of the estate . . . . " (Emphasis supplied.)
9 Treas. Reg. § 1. 2 12-1(o) (1957) "The provisions of section 212 are not
intended in any way to disallow expenses which would otherwise be allow-
able under section 162 and the regulations thereunder. Double deductions
are not permitted. Amounts deducted under one provision of the Internal




effect on section 642 (g). Commissioner v. Mary E. Burrow Trust,
333 F.2d 66 (10th Cir. 1964).
Prior to 1942 there were no statutory provisions regarding the
deduction of one expense in computing both the taxable estate and
the taxable income thereof. However, it was held in court decisions
that the deduction would be allowed in computing both the tax-
able estate and the taxable income since the taxes were provided
for under different statutes" and were based upon different theor-
ies.1 2 Unless Congress had specifically prohibited the double deduc-
tion of an expense, it would be deductible under both statutes al-
lowing for the deduction.
1"
A 1942 amendment 14 to the Code provided that if an item was
deducted in accordance with section 812 (b)'15 in computing the tax-
able estate, it could not be again deducted as an expense under sec-
tion 2311 in computing the taxable income of the estate. The purpose
of section 162 (e) was to prevent a taxpayer from claiming one ex-
pense as a deduction for two separate purposes, 7 though there were
10 Relating to trade or business expenses.
I' Kleberg v. Commissioner, 31 B.T.A. 95 (1934). Acquiesced in by the Com-
missioner, XIII-2 Cum. Bull. 11 (1934). But see O'Neil v. Commissioner, 31
B.T.A. 727 (1934), in which the court did not allow property taxes owing
at the date of the decedent's death to be deducted in computing the estate's
taxable income when the item had already been deducted in computing the
taxable estate. It appears that the only reconciling feature between these
two cases is that in the Kleberg case the amounts expended were for the
administration of the decedent's property after his death, while in the
O'Neil case the amount expended only represented an accrued expense at
the decedent's death, and thus only properly deducted from the estate corpus
on the estate tax return.
12 Kleberg v. Commissioner, supra note 11, at 100. The estate tax is a one-time
excise on the transfer of property while the income tax is an annual tax on
net income.
13 Adams v. Commissioner, 110 F.2d 578 (8th Cir. 1940); Brown v. Commis-
sioner, 74 F.2d 281 (10th Cir. 1934).
14Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 162(e), added by ch. 619, 56 Stat. 861 (1942).
15 Int. Rev. Code of 1939 § 812 (b), relating to the expenses, losses, indebted-
ness, and taxes of an estate.
VId. § 23, relating to the allowable deductions from gross income.
17 Luehrmann's Estate v. Commissioner, 287 F.2d 10 (8th Cir. 1961).
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no prohibitions against allocating the expense deduction between
the taxable estate and the taxable income of the estate in any man-
ner desired.'8 Accordingly it was subsequently held that an executor
who deducted his commissions in computing the taxable estate
could not deduct these commissions in computing the taxable in-
come of the estate.' 9 The provisions of section 162 (e) were essential-
ly carried over as section 642 (g) of the 1954 Code.
2 0
The Burrow Trust case is the first to determine whether sec-
tion 642 (g) extends to trusts the property of which is included in
the taxable estate. The decision of the court is in accord with the
well-established rules that tax statutes are to be strictly construed,
21
and that there are to be no implications from the statute beyond the
clear language used therein.22 The court reasoned that Congress
must have intended to omit the words "or trust" following the
words "taxable income of the estate" in section 642(g), since all
the other subsections of section 642 use the words "estate or trust."
The Commissioner argued that the language of Treasury Regu-
lation § 1.212-1 (o),23 that "Amounts deducted under one provision
of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 cannot again be deducted un-
der any other provision thereof," applies to all sections of the 1954
Code.24 The court disagreed, observing that the Regulation refers
specifically to deductions which might properly be made under
either section 212 or under section 162, which provides for deduc-
tions for trade or business expense. Judge Lewis noted that the sub-
stance of Treasury Regulation § 1.212-1 (o) was already in effect
when section 162 (e) of the 1939 Code was enacted, 25 and concluded
that if the Commissioner's contention was correct there would have
been no need for section 162 (e).
In addition to section 642 (g) there is at least one other Code
provision which allows the same expense to be deducted on both
the estate tax and the income tax returns. Section 691 (b) allows a
deduction on the estate's income tax return for the payment of ex-
18 Rev. Rul. 240, 1953-2 Cum. Bull. 79.
19 Simon v. Hoey, 88 F. Supp. 754 (S.D. N.Y. 1949), aff'd, 180 F.2d 354, cert.
denied, 339 U.S. 966 (1950).
20 Supra note 8.
21 Masonite Corp. v. Commissioner, 194 F.2d 257 (5th Cir. 1952).
22 Kohl v. United States, 226 F.2d 381 (7th Cir. 1955) ; DeLuxe Check Printers
v. Kelm, 99 F. Supp. 785 (D.C. Minn. 1951); Mead Corp. v. Commissioner,
116 F.2d 187 (3rd Cir. 1941); Pennsylvania Co. for Ins. on Lives and
Granting Annuities v. United States, 39 F. Supp. 1019 (E.D. Pa. 1941).
23 Supra note 9.
24 This argument was not raised in the Tax Court.
25 Treas. Reg. § 1.212-1(o) (1957) was Treas. Reg. 103, § 19.23 under Int.
Rev. Code of 1939. Immediately prior to the enactment of the 1954 Code,
the Regulation was cited as Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.23(a)-15(m).
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penses which were accrued on the date of the decedent's death.26
The accrued expenses also constitute claims against the estate, and
as such are deductible under the authority of section 2053 (a) (3)
in computing the taxable estate. Although section 642 (g) refers to
section 2053 generally, the Regulations state that section 642 (g)
will not affect the operation of section 691 (b) .27 The reason for this
is that section 691 (b) relates to expenses accrued at the date of
death, while section 642 (g) only pertains to those expenses incurred
after the date of death.
The Commissioner generally follows a policy of either acquies-
cence or nonacquiescence in a decision of the Tax Court since he
does not feel bound by a Tax Court decision as a matter of law.
28
As of the date of this Comment, the Commissioner has published
neither his acquiescence nor nonacquiescence in the decision of the
Burrow Trust case. There has been no appeal since the Solicitor
General denied the Commissioner the authority to file a writ of
certiorari. 29 As a result, we are left with a decision by which the
Commissioner does not feel bound, and consequently future at-
tempts at the kind of deductions used in Burrow Trust will pro-
bably be met by opposition from the Internal Revenue Service.
Alan D. Lewis
26 Under Int. Rev. Code of 1939 the comparable provision was section 126(b).
This provision is limited to expenses arising from either a trade or business,
interest, taxes, production, conservation, or management of income, or
depletion.
27 Treas. Reg. § 1.642(g)-2 (1956).
28 9 MERTENS, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 50.94 (Zimet Revision 1958).
29 CCH STAND. FED. TAX REP., vol. 7, p. 70,807 (revised to 10-14-64).
Trust The Moving and Storage Requirements
Of Yourself and Your Clients-
To Men Who Understand Your Problems.
CONFER WITH DON JOHNSON
JOHNSON STORAGE & MOVING CO.
Affiliated With United Van Lines
221 RAce
Broadway Local and World-wide 2-2855
1964 COMMENTS
